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BEYOND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: INCREASING
NOTICE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Brian M. Murray *
INTRODUCTION

Jason Lawson 1 is a twenty-five-year-old African American male
with a criminal record. 2 He is currently unemployed despite possessing a high school diploma and an associate's degree from a local, urban community college, which is more higher education
than the vast majority of his neighbors. 3 He plans to earn his
bachelor's degree in the evening once he finds steady employment.
* Abraham Freedman Fellow and Lecturer-in-Law, Temple University, Beasley
School of Law; J.D., 2011, magna cum laude, Notre Dame Law School; B.A., 2008, Philosophy and Political Science, summa cum laude, Villanova University. I would like to express my gratitude for the comments of Professor Rick Greenstein and Professor Jennifer
Mason McAward while drafting this article. I also would like to extend a heartfelt thank
you to my wife, Katherine, for her unyielding support, my daughter Elizabeth, for her inspiring wonder and curiosity in all things, and my entire family, for their unconditional
love, continuous patience, and enduring encouragement.
1. The following account is a fictional scenario based on the author's experience as a
practicing attorney in both the criminal defense and employment law contexts.
2. Mr. Lawson, as an African American male, is sadly somewhat average when it
comes to his criminal record. Statistics indicate that disproportionate shares of African
American males have some type of criminal record, whether that means a conviction or an
arrest record. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ
197976, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, 5-6 (Aug.
2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf. See generally Erica
Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at
Al6 (noting 30.2% of twenty-three-year-olds surveyed reported having been arrested for
"an offense other than a minor traffic violation," compared to 22% who made a similar report in a 1965 study). This has caused the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") to conclude that some employment practices may have a disparate impact on
African Americans and Latinos. EEOC GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter EEOC, GUIDANCE], available at http:
//www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm.
3. Only roughly 20% of African Americans over twenty-five possessed a college degree as of 2010. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AnSTHACT OF nm UNITED STATES:
2012 151 tbl.229 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables
/12s0229.pdf (statistic under the table titled, "Educational Attainment by Hace and Hispanic Origin: 1970 to 2010").
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Lawson lives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was born and
raised in North Philadelphia, which is one of the poorest areas of
the city. The product of a disjointed household, Lawson was a star
football player at his high school; however, he did not have the
funds to supplement a partial scholarship to a Division I college. 1
As will be explained below, he also had a felony conviction at the
age of eighteen. Therefore he did not leave the city, instead trying
to pay his way through the local community college.
After Lawson graduated from high school, he spent the summer working odd jobs to earn some money. One of Lawson's coworkers sold marijuana. Lawson purchased some for personal use
on a few occasions but never shared it with anyone. On one occasion, while riding in his co-worker's van to the next job, the police
stopped the van for running a red light. During the stop, the police learned that the co-worker's driver's license had been suspended due to a prior Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") conviction. Because the driver would be taken into custody, the officers
asked Lawson if he could remove the vehicle from the roadway.
An urbanite his entire life, Lawson responded that he did not
have a license. The officers decided to impound the vehicle and
conduct an inventory search. 5 The officers located ten pounds of
packaged marijuana in the trunk.
Lawson and his co-worker were arrested at the scene and
charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. 6 Lawson's bail was set at $50,000. Unable to post this
amount, he sat in a Philadelphia prison for nine months while his
case continued to be re-listed for trial. Without funds to hire private counsel, his overworked, court-assigned public defender 7

4. See generally Jerry Carino, Athletes, Administrators Debate Scholarship Stipends,
USA TODAY (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/09/28/ath
letes-administrators-debate-ncaa-scholarship-stipends/2890117/ (describing how even fullscholarship student athletes can face financial difficulty).
5. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-76 (1976) (describing
the proper bases and considerations to justify an inventory search pursuant to arrest);
Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Opperman
factors when determining validity of an inventory search).
6. See generally 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-113(a)(30) (2013).
7. Charges that result in actual incarceration entitle a defendant to the right to
counsel under the United States Constitution. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1979). In Pennsylvania, the right to counsel is the same as that guaranteed by the Sixth
Amenclment. See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999). For more discussion on the fecleral right to counsel, see infra Part III.
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(who changed with each court appearance) sought to negotiate a
plea, notwithstanding the glaring suppression and trial issues
8
within the case. One of those attorneys was able to negotiate a
time-served guilty plea with two years of probation to follow. 9
Tired of waiting for resolution of his case and anxious to return to
his once promising life, Lawson accepted the offer. 10
At no point during his stay in jail, conversations with his attorney, or colloquy before the judge did anyone mention the collateral consequences of a felony conviction. 11 Unfortunately for
Mr. Lawson, neither the individual players involved, nor the system itself, notified him that he will likely struggle to find employment his entire life 12 and that his conviction would categorically bar him from entering certain professions, not to mention
pursuing other privileges available to non-felons, such as owning
a firearm, voting, or running for political office. 13 Mr. Lawson
might struggle to even work as a janitor at a local public school
with children under the age of thirteen. 14

8. Specifically, whether the inventory search was valid and whether Lawson "knowingly" possessed the marijuana in the trunk.
9. This is a fairly mild sentence for a possession with intent to deliver conviction.
Although it does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence in Pennsylvania, unless firearms are involved, sentences can involve multiple years in prison. See PENN. COMM'N ON
SENTENCING, SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT app. at 128, available
at http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports/2013/view.
10. See generally Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 603, 605-07 (1956) (discussing how the lowest-level courts in Philadelphia valued
the rapid disposition of cases). While this article is nearly sixty years old, the volume of
cases processed in Philadelphia has not decreased.
11. Sec generally John D. King, Beyond "Life and Liberty''.· The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HAHV. C.R.-C.L. L. RFN. 1, 23 (2013) ("The hidden consequences of a conviction
may not ever be explained to the person choosing to plead guilty, leading to unjust results
that happen more regularly and more severely than ever before."). Drug crimes carry myriad consequences. See also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002) [hereinafter
Chin, Race].
12. See generally MICHELLE N. RODHIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NA'I"L EMP'T LAW
PIW.JECT, 65 MILLION "NEED NOT APPLY": THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page
/-/65_million_need_not_apply.pdf?nocdn=l (indicating that individuals with criminal records will struggle obtaining jobs).
13. See Hugh Lafollette, Collateral Consequences of Punishment: Civil Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 241, 241-42 (2005).
14. See 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-lll(e)(2) (1992) (listing felony convictions under ''The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act" as prohibitive under section (a),
which includes janitorial positions). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recently announced three decisions impacting the fate of this law. Croll v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist.,
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The twin realities of a criminal justice system dominated by
guilty pleas and legislatures increasing the consequences associated with a criminal conviction place someone like Mr. Lawson in.
no-man's land for the rest of his life. Although fairly resourceful
up to the point of his conviction and hopeful for a better future,
Mr. Lawson is now facing significant uphill battles for a livelihood. In that sense, it is not clear that the punishment fits the
crime. Although he possesses a criminal conviction, he is perhaps
most guilty of being-through no fault of his own-somewhat legally illiterate when it comes to the non-financial and indirect
implications of his felony guilty plea.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye 15 and
Padilla v. Kentucky, 16 while failing to usher a sea change in rightto-counsel jurisprudence, suggest that the Court is becoming
11
more aware of the costs of a criminal conviction. Frye recognizes
the prevalence of guilty pleas and the need for adequate representation in the bargaining context; 18 Padilla acknowledges that
some collateral consequences, like deportation, are significant
enough to require a warning for a defendant's counsel to be considered effective. 19 Perhaps most importantly, they solidify developing jurisprudence that recognizes the importance of notice
within the criminal system, albeit through attorneys.
In the wake of both decisions, many commentators have called
for an expansion of the right to counsel, especially for defendants
facing charges that do not carry the threat of incarceration, in order to address the myriad collateral consequences associated with
20
a criminal record. The premise of the argument is that counsel is
2012 WL 8668130, at *7, *13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (finding that 24 PA. STAT.
ANN.§ 1-lll(e)(l) violates substantive due process rights guaranteed by Article 1, Section
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but rejecting the argument that it violates the Ex Post
Facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution); Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit,
59 A.3d 10, 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (finding 24 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 1-lll(e)(l) unconstitutional as a violation Johnson's substantive due process rights under Article 1, Section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution); Jones v. Penn. Delco Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 8668277, at *7,
*13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (same finding as Croll).
15. 566 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
16. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
17. But see United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014) (finding "the law does not require a defendant to be informed of the collateral consequences of a plea").
18. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
19. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
20. See King, supra note 11, at 36-48.
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the silver bullet necessary to craft plea deals that avoid such consequences. A defense counsel driven solution would likely mitigate the number of unknowing-and perhaps unintelligentpleas, especially for the unrepresented, and conceivably shift the
current paradigm. But is it enough? Or do the plea bargain realities of the criminal system demand something more? Furthermore, would expansion of the right to counsel continue to place
too much of the burden on already overworked defense attorneys
and unknowing defendants, represented or not? Are there other
players within the system that can and should help?
This article responds to these questions by focusing on the primary roots of this justice issue, namely the prevalence of guilty
pleas and the continued efforts of legislatures to increase the lifelong price of a conviction. Part I begins with a discussion of these
practical realities within the criminal justice system. Part II then
examines the law of guilty pleas under the Fifth Amendment, including constitutional standards for valid pleas, and how current
jurisprudence fails to account for the collateral consequences
mentioned in Part I. Part II also discusses the right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, post-Padilla
and Frye, and concludes that the spirit of both cases is the increased notice of collateral consequences, albeit through defense
counsel. Part III describes the current state of the law on the
right to counsel and analyzes the merits and shortcomings of expanding the right to counsel in order to address the problem of
collateral consequences. Finally, Part IV offers a few solutions
that are more systemic in nature, in contrast to total reliance on
the attorney-client relationship, and that involve the judiciary
and prosecutors. Part IV also proposes new disclosure obligations
for the judiciary and the prosecution because any system-wide solution to the growing effect of collateral consequences must include the various players involved.
I. REALITIES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The realities of the criminal justice system as they pertain to
the effect of a criminal conviction are stark. Guilty pleas are the
primary source of convictions, which occur at an incredible rate
following the initiation of charges. These convictions result in
myriad, immediate, and direct consequences, as well as shadow
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consequences that continue to affect offenders for the rest of their
lives. Although the number of collateral consequences has increased dramatically over the years, knowledge of their scope and
breadth is lost on various players within the system. This section
explains how these twin realities, namely the prevalence of guilty
pleas and increasing collateral consequences, coupled with widespread consequence illiteracy amongst players within the system,
demands a response.

A. The Prevalence of Guilty Pleas
Guilty pleas are the norm rather than the exception when it
comes to resolving criminal cases. The most recent statistics from
the federal government suggest that almost 97% of federal cases
result in a plea. 21 The numbers in state systems are comparable:
the same percent of felony filings in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States resulted in pleas. 22 These pleas often
come early in the process and are disproportionately entered by
23
defendants in custody.
Pleas became commonplace over time. Although the common
law was skeptical of bargaining to induce admissions of guilt, 21
the simultaneous effects of over-criminalization25 and resource
scarcity led to the plea becoming the most efficient outcome for all
26
parties in an overwhelmed criminal justice system. The enforcement of broader-reaching statutes resulted in significantly

21. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR
2011 a (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research·and-publica
tions/research-publications/2012/FYl 1_0verview_Federal_ Criminal_Cases. pdf.
22. See Jenny Hoberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators,"
9:3 MINN. L. HEV. 670, 682 n.59 (2008).
2:3. ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, THREEMINU'l'E JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011).
24. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea-Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 10:3 J. CRIM. L. &
CmMINOLOGY 1, 7 n.:39 (201:3).
25. See King, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing how the "broken windows" theory of
policing emerged in the 1980s and dramatically reduced police discretion in enforcement of
statutes).
26. See Foote, supra note 10, at 64&-44 (recognizing efficiency as the primary reason
for the adjudication of low-level offenses). Several years before, by the Great Depression,
as one commentator has noted, plea-bargaining emerged as a crucial response to the
overwhelmed system. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 10.
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more criminal defendants in low-level prosecutions, thereby taxing local courts and forcing prosecutors and criminal defendants
to act expeditiously. 27 In 2006 alone, roughly 10.5 million misdemeanor prosecutions occurred. 28
While pleas became the common practice on the ground, by the
second half of the nineteenth century they also received the imprimatur of notable institutions. The American Bar Association
("ABA") sought to justify the paradigm shift by highlighting how
pleas allowed courts to focus their energies on cases where the
presumption of innocence actually mattered.w While that point
may be true on a theoretical level, the shift also had the effect of
inverting the otherwise well-known burden of proof within the
criminal system. 30 The system began to expect defendants to
plead rather than exercise their trial rights. In fact, exercising
the procedural protections afforded to defendants would likely result in mass upheaval within the system. 31 Perhaps unknowingly,

27. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 9 ("As the number of criminal statutesand, as a result, criminal defendants-swelled, court systems became overwhelmed."); see
also K. Babe Howell, Brohen Lives from Brohen Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 281 (2009) (comparing New York City's 86,000 non-felony arrests in 1989, prior to the introduction of the
city's strategy of Zero Tolerance Policing, with the 176,000 non-felony arrests in 1998, after the strategy had been implemented); King, supra note 11, at 20 ("As the numbers have
increased over the past few decades, the tension has increased: 'broken windows' policing
has led to more arrests, which has led inexorably to more prosecutions, which has led in
turn to larger caseloads on prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges.").
28. RonERT c. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: 'l'HE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMEIUCA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
Comns 11 (2009).
29. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting Arvl. BAH Ass'N, PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDAHDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2
(1967) ("[T]he limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has
grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the
presumption of innocence.")).
30. See EmK LUNA & MAIUANNE L. WADE, THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 22 (2012) (noting how the crime control model "begins from a presumption of
guilt and an overriding faith in the administrative processes that precede the bringing of
the formal charge in court").
al. King, supra note 11, at 21 ("If every defendant charged with a misdemeanor were
to insist meaningfully and fully on her rights-not only to counsel and a trial, but also to
the presumption of innocence, compulsory process, confrontation rights, and all of the other formal procedural safeguards to which she is entitled-the system of criminal prosecution would have to undergo enormous change in response."); see also Donald A. Dripps,
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN.
S·r. L. REV. 1155, 1155-56 (2005) ("The distinction between substance and procedure pervades academic thinking all the way down to the foundations .... [i]n trial-level courthouses, however, the distinction fades, as the defendant trades his procedural rights for
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the Supreme Court of the United States helped to codify the "necessity" of plea-bargaining in Brady v. United States, which outlined the operative standard for determining the legitimacy of
pleas. 32 'rhe sentencing guidelines used by federal and state
courts, designed to rectify sentencing disparities, also indirectly
contributed to the culture of pleas because prosecutors could essentially manipulate charges to reach a desired sentencing
range. 33 Prosecutors also could determine sentencing recommendations based on whether a defendant chose to take a plea or pursue a trial, often resulting in a trial penalty. 31
Modern scholarship has shed light on perhaps the most troubling aspect of the plea culture: the willingness to admit guilt, despite innocence, due to extraneous factors. In other words, the
plea has become the rational choice irrespective of the merits of
the actual criminal case, simply by virtue of the fact that fighting
charges results in various types of costs to a criminal defendant,
not the least of which could be his or her liberty pre-trial. 35 The
once sacrosanct assumption that trials provided the ultimate
backstop for determining truth has met actual practice.
In a careful study conducted by Lucian E. Dervan, roughly six
out of ten innocent study participants took a plea deal. 36 More
than half of the innocent participants would take the deal regardless of the leniency of the sentence, which suggests that additional factors, such as time, reputation, and other anterior interests
motivate guilty pleas. 37 The system seems to recognize the riskaverse nature of criminal defendants and turns the plea into a
reductions in his substantive liability.").
32. 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970); see infra Part II.A.
33. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TIUUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 17 (2003); see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117,
1128 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market] ("A range of possible overlapping charges can fit a single transaction or episode, and prosecutors have discretion to choose among them to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to achieve
pleas, or any number of reasons.").
34. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 14--15 n.88-89.
35. See Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and
the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 450 (2011) ("When the deal is good
enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually innocent.").
36. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 33-34.
37. See id. at 36-38.
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self-reinforcing, rational expectation for new defendants entering
the system.:is Refusing to plead guilty can become the irrational
choice, especially to defendants who are unaware of indirect consequences down the road. 39
B. Increasing Collateral Consequences

A collateral consequence, as defined by courts and commentators, is a ramification that is indirect, inexplicit, or implicit, and a
result of the "fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of
the court." 40 Some collateral consequences are automatic, such as
in the case of mandatory registration of sex offenders. 41 Others
are discretionary, such as additional barriers to obtaining a professional license. 42 Direct consequences, by contrast, are penal
sanctions stemming directly from the guilty plea. 43 Examples include incarceration, fines, probation, and parole, which are all
controlled by the sentencing court. 44 Most circuit courts connect
direct consequences to the range of a defendant's punishment,
which contrasts with the effect of a conviction post-punishment. 45

38. See id. at 38 ("[O]ne needs to be concerned not only that significant sentencing
differentials might lead felony defendants to falsely condemn themselves through plea
bargaining, but also that misdemeanor defendants might be pleading guilty based on factors wholly distinct from their actual factual guilt."); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2012) (noting how early guilty pleas are especially troubling because they are not subject to the "adversarial testing'' that should drive
criminal adjudication: "a police officer's bare decision to arrest can lead inexorably, and
with little scrutiny, to a guilty plea").
39. See, e.g., Russell Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 79 & n.19, 80 (2009) ("[P]lea bargains will be most generous (and
therefore most frequently accepted) in cases involving misdemeanors and other less serious offenses. The process costs expended by defendants will be particularly high relative to
penalty costs where only minor penalties are involved."). Interestingly and relevant to the
next part of this article, Covey appears to be talking only about direct consequences.
40. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 623, 634 (2006) (describing the nature of collateral consequences); see e.g., People
v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995) (describing collateral consequences as peculiar
and often imposed by agencies).
41. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9799.13 (2012).
42. See, e.g., 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 559 (2014) (barber license); id. § 124.1 (dental
hygienist); id. (real estate broker); id. §§ 1909, 1911 (social worker); id. § 2408(c) (taxi
driver).
43. Roberts, supra note 22, at 672-73.
44. Id. at 672, 689-93.
45. Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). One
hundred and seventy-seven decisions cite Cuthrell for this understanding. Roberts, supra
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One particularly astute commentator has emphasized how the
distinction between direct and collateral consequences is mythical, especially when one considers that a significant number of
collateral consequences are automatically inflicted. 16 In other
words, the line between an automatic collateral consequence,
such as mandatory sex offender registration or a driver's license
suspension, and a direct consequence, such as a fine, is hard to
decipher when both stem from the fact of a conviction and occur
by operation of law.
Perhaps the only thing rivaling the significance of collateral
consequences for a defendant is their quantity. Generally speaking, legislatures have increased the number of collateral consequences in the past thirty years or so. 47 Cataloguing these consequences has become a national project. 48 Legislatures have
limited re-entry options in terms of employment eligibility, undermined custody rights, narrowed access to public benefits such
as welfare and housing, and imposed barriers to political participation.49 The result is that a significant percentage of ex-offenders
continue to feel the effects of their convictions in ways that rival,

note 22, at 690 n.93
46. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 689-93; see also Bibas, supra note 33, at 1130 ("The
neat walls between criminal and civil, and between direct and collateral consequences,
have steadily eroded in recent years.").
47. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAIWLE AND PHISONER
REENTRY 9 (2003); LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL
BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 8 (2004), available at http://www.lac.
org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf; see also Chin, Race, supra note 11, at 259-60 (describing several consequences under the federal code).
48. AM. BAR Ass'N, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION [hereinafter ABA, NICCC], available at http://www.abacollateralconsequenc
es.org/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
49. PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 9 ("Since 1980, the United States has passed dozens
of laws restricting the kinds of jobs for which ex-prisoners can be hired, easing the requirements for their parental rights to be terminated, restricting their access to public
welfare and housing subsidies, and limiting their right to vote."); see also LEGAL ACTION
CTR., supra note 47, at 10 (noting how thirty-seven states allow discrimination in employment due to arrest records, even if the individual was never convicted). Many commentators would prefer a significant reduction in the volume of collateral consequences in any
given jurisdiction. This article proceeds from the assumption that collateral consequences
are unlikely to be significantly reduced by legislatures anytime soon given that they have
grown exponentially in the past half century. Thus, the article seeks to propose a framework for alleviating their effect through the adjudication process, which contains the major actors that determine the circumstances that ultimately lead to an offender encountering such consequences.
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if not exceed, the direct consequences felt at the time of the actual
50
pea.
1
1. Employment

The most significant collateral consequences-both for the individual defendant and in terms of societal costs-are arguably
the barriers to employment that ex-offenders face after pleading
guilty. The ability to work is at the heart of citizenship and being
a member of the community. 51 While many state laws limit the
ability of employers to consider criminal records, 52 enforcement of
such laws is minimal. 53 Furthermore, for every law regulating
employer hiring and decision-making practices, there are myriad
laws barring ex-offenders from consideration for certain positions. 51 Countless others provide employers with extra discretion

50. See Nora Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999) ("(C]ollateral
sentencing consequences have contributed to exiling ex-offenders within their country,
even after expiration of their maximum sentences."); see also King, supra note 11, at 23
("These collateral consequences often constitute a far more serious form of punishment
than the direct consequences of a conviction, especially for the many people convicted of
low-level crimes who are never sentenced to incarceration.").
51. See JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-64
(1991) (discussing the importance of being an "earner" to be a citizen).
52. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. A.1'/N. § 9125(b) (2012). This statute prohibits employers from considering felony and misdemeanor convictions unless they are related to the
applicant's suitability for employment, or in other words, are related to the job at issue. Id.
See also CAL. LAn. CODE§ 432.8 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-702 (2015); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-79, 46a-80 (2015); GA. CODE ANN.§ 42-8-63 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §
378-2.5 (2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-3-27 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(£) (1997);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-109 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21-151B, § 4(9); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 561.016 (1979); MONT. ADMIN. 24.9.1410 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-2
(1978); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW. §§ 23-A752, 753 (2007); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.32,
2953.33, 2953.55 (2014); VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-389 (2014); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 162-12140 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 111.32 et seq., lll.335(1)(c)(l)-(2) (2010).
53. For example, there is only one reported case for the above-cited law that directly
corresponds to the suitability for employment issue. See Cisco v. United Parcel Serv. Inc.,
476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Lack of enforcement, either through private
right of actions, or by state agencies, remains a problem. See Employment Rights of Workers with Criminal Records, NA'l''L EMP'T LAW PROJ., available at http://www.nelp.org/con
tent/content_issues/category/employment_rights_of_workers_ with_criminal_records (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015) ("Although employers may (to varying legal degrees) consider a worker's criminal history as part of the application process, employers often fail to comply with
a range of federal and state laws that provide fundamental protections against abuse of
criminal background checks."). Considering that most ex-offenders are struggling to make
ends meet, it is not surprising that few have pursued costly litigation under an unsettled
statute.
54. See CMTY. LEGAL SERV., !NC., LEGAL REMEDIES AND LIMITA'rIONS ON THE
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to deny applicants. 55 Coupled vvith federal and -state statutes that
require criminal background checks and the quick and easy
availability of such information, the scarlet letter that is a conviction becomes more permanent and brighter for all to see. 56 Furthermore, such consequences have societal costs as well: they can
slant measurements used to determine societal well-being, such
as the unemployment rate. 57
Pennsylvania law, 58 like that in most states, lists offenses or
types of offenses that will preclude employment in a particular
field. For example, the Older Adult Protective Services Act contained lifetime bans due to certain prior convictions. 59 Various occupations with licensing boards are given broad discretion to refuse licenses to an applicant with a felony or misdemeanor
conviction. 60 These same boards are often required by law to consider convictions and sometimes are prohibited from issuing a li-

EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 9-12 (updated May
2014) [hereinafter CLS] (noting how individuals with certain types of convictions cannot
seek employment as airport employees, at banks, insurance company employees, in longterm care facilities, in certain security positions, and at schools, even for custodial positions).
55. Id. at 13-19 (discussing various fields that may be off limits to those with convictions, including accountancy, architecture, barbering, working in casinos, dental hygiene,
funeral directing, working in horse stables, car dealing, taxi driving, and social work).
56. ,Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 nn.40-45 (2011). Stories of old
criminal convictions coming back to haunt ex-offenders who have steadily rebuilt their
lives are becoming more well-publicized. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Op-Ed, Paying a Price, Long After the Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/opinion/paying-a-price-long-after-the-crime.html?_r=O
(describing an employer's refusal to hire an applicant due to a twenty-five year-old conviction).
57. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND lNEQUALI'l'Y IN AMERICA 69-70 (2006).
58. Because the scenario in the beginning of this article was set in Philadelphia, this
section will focus its attention on the collateral consequences related to employment in
Pennsylvania. Although these consequences are unique to this jurisdiction, other state
laws mirror those in the books in Pennsylvania. See supra note 52 (identifying a Pennsylvania conviction-related statute along with similar laws from several other states).
59. 35 PA. S'I'AT. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (2014). Under OAPSA, nursing homes, home
health care agencies, and other workers in long-term care facilities, even if not having direct contact with patients, could not have any theft convictions at any time. See id. §
10225.103 (2014) (defining "FACILITY" as including the following: "[a] domiciliary care
home[,] ... [a] home health care agency[,] ... [a] long-term care nursing facility[,] ... [a]n
older adult daily living center[,] ... [a] personal care home ... "). 'rhis law was struck
down as a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Nixon v. Commonwealth. 839 A.2d
277, 279 (Pa. 2003). At this time, however, the law has not been amended and enforcement
remains subject to the priorities of state agencies. 35 PA. STA'l'. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (2014).
60. CLS, supra note 54, at 13-19.
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cense to individuals with certain convictions, irrespective of that
individual's rehabilitation post-conviction or the underlying facts
in the case. 61 Similar prohibitions exist under federal law, 62 including for employees at airports, 63 banks, 61 ports, 65 and in prisons. 66
For further examples, one can simply search the ABA's collateral consequences database, which is a project supported by the
National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and the
United States Department of Justice. 67 The website suggests to
the interested onlooker that the barriers can seem endless. A
simple search of employment consequences under federal law
lists nearly six hundred possible ramifications, including the inability to file a claim for adverse action based on a conviction. 68 The
same search locates nearly three hundred employment consequences in Pennsylvania, 69 including ineligibility as a dog license
processor or warden, 70 or as the manager or participant in the
setup of a bingo game. 71 While the number of job seekers for those
positions may be small, the law also significantly limits those
convicted of various offenses from employment in any school in
any position, including after-hours and custodial positions where
the amount of potential contact with students may be close to zero. 72
The available remedies for denials of employment based on a
conviction record are limited, although the law is developing at
both the federal and state level. Many states attempt to limit employer discretion to some degree by requiring that a conviction, if
not barring someone from a specific position, only be considered if
61. Id. at 13.
62. See e.g. 10 U.S.C. § 986(c)(l) (2000).
63. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44936(b)(l)(B)(xiv)(IX) (2000); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1542.209(d),
1544.229(d) (2014).
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2012) (prohibiting employment of anyone with a crime of
dishonesty).
65. See 46 U.S.C. § 70105(c)(l) (2012); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (2014).
66. 28 C.F.R. § 105.23 (2012).
67. ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description (describing the history of the
National Inventory of Collateral Consequences).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 14.
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it is related to employment. n In Pennsylvania, the analogous
statute is fairly untested and the statute does not define how to
determine whether a conviction relates to a candidate's suitability for employment. 74
As for federal standards, many scholars, commentators, and attorneys suggest that individuals with convictions may be able to
pursue disparate impact litigation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act because African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. 75 While
this theory has popped up in various courtrooms since the 1970s,
very few litigants have succeeded. 76 In fact, after 1990, such
claims were often unsuccessful. 77 In a minor victory for future
plaintiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that employment policies must "accurately distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk
and those that do not." 78 Despite judicial unwillingness to develop

73. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9125(b) (2012); see also supra note 52.
74. There are very few reported cases under this statute. But see Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. 1984) (construing statute as allowing employers to only consider felony and misdemeanor convictions). Further, no state agency is assigned to enforce the statute, which means that its terms are enforced only through a
private lawsuit.
75. See Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination
Against Minority Men With Criminal Records, 14 BEHKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 2, 4-5
(2013).
76. See Green v. Missouri Pac. RR Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding invalid a blanket disqualification based on convictions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a provision attempting to remedy past discrimination by removing scrutiny based on past misdemeanor and felony convictions was too
broad); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 P. Supp. 836, 854 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (holding that the use of
arrests and convictions favored white men over black men); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of
America, 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) (holding that firing a bellman based on his
prior conviction of theft was not racially discriminatory under the argument that more
black persons than white have been convicted of various crimes), aff'd mem., 468 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1972); Gregory v. Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding
that an employer's policy of not hiring candidates who have multiple arrests without convictions had a foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal opportunity and was
hence unlawful), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); EEOC Decision
No. 74-89 (1974); EEOC Decision No. 71-2682 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Matthews v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff for failing to establish a prima facie case); Lewis v. Ala.
Dep't of Public Safety, 831 P. Supp. 824 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (dismissing due to plaintiffs failure to make requisite statistical showing); Williams v. Scott, No. 92 C 5747, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13643 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (noting that defendant established business
necessity to fire employee from "collector" position).
78. El v. S.E. Pa. 'l'ransp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting how empirical evidence should support an employer's decision to link a conviction to suitability and
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the theory, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") recently issued Guidance under Title VII for employers
to use when considering criminal records. 79 The Guidance lends
credibility to the theory that facially neutral policies could result
in a disparate impact. 80 However, pursuit of such litigation is subject to all of the usual procedural and substantive hurdles applicable to Title VII, including difficult burdens of proof for a plaintiff.81 Furthermore, such litigation would rarely, if ever, provide
the type of immediate relief needed by a job applicant with a
82
criminal record.

2. Public Benefits and Privileges
Criminal convictions impact eligibility for public benefits and
privileges otherwise available to a member of the community.
Convictions can lead to ineligibility for unemployment benefits, 83
loss of retirement benefits for public officials, 81 and disqualification from welfare, 80 cash assistance, 86 and medical assistance. 87
possible job performance).
79. EEOC, GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
80. The Guidance disfavors across-the-board exclusions, rejections due to arrest information, and calls for a three-part analysis for employers to evaluate convictions, including the nature and gravity of the offense, the time that has passed since the offense, and
·the nature of the job sought. Id.; see Part V.B. Furthermore, if an employer seeks to reject
a candidate, the Guidance calls for an "individualized assessment" involving several other
factors unique to the applicant's situation. Id.
81. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that
burden shift framework applies to employment discrimination cases). The problems of
proof, especially in a disparate impact case, remain for advocates attempting to establish
unlawful discrimination on the basis of criminal records. Additionally, it is unclear whether Title VII actually preempts state regulation of employment practices, particularly in
this field. Express preemption seems to be off of the table given 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7
(2012). And whether conflict or obstacle preemption is applicable is a fairly untested area
of the law. But even if Title VII were to survive a preemption challenge, the Guidance itself does not maintain the force of law. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142, 144
(1976) (labeling the EEOC guidelines as "interpretative regulations" whose weight depends "upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
82. How many ex-offenders have the time, money, or wherewithal to make a federal
case of it?
83. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 802(g), 87l(b) (2009).
84. Id. § 1313(a).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(l)(A) (2012); see 55 PA. CODE§ 141.21(t) (2015).
86. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4239 (2010); id. § 432.24 (listing eligibility regulations
for an individual who has been convicted of a controlled substances offense).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(3) (2012); 55 PA. CODE§ 1101.92(c)(l) (2015).

1154

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW ~EVIEW

[Vol. 49:1139

They also can result in forcible eviction from public housing88 and
the inability to live with someone, related or unrelated, who is
seeking child custody. 89 The effect of strict housing restrictions is
especially difficult for ex-offenders who may need some additional
support when transitioning back into living on their own fulltime. Even veterans may lose the ability to reside in stateoperated residences specifically designed for former service members.90 Convictions for drug-related offenses can also render student loan assistance unattainable. 91 For the indigent defendant
struggling to regain footing, the loss of such public benefits is
even more significant. When one considers that the vast majority
of ex-offenders must pay back fines, costs, and other penalties af92
ter a term of incarceration, or risk being re-incarcerated, the inability to obtain public benefits renders this task even more challenging. The societal costs of ex-offender default can be
staggering: additional terms of incarceration that cost taxpayer
money and possibly more crime committed by those desperate to
make ends meet.
A criminal record also can affect custody of one's children, even
if the conviction occurred before someone became a parent. In
Pennsylvania, theft crimes automatically render a parent ineligible for participation in a subsidized child-care program. 93 Again,
the indigent defendant who is also a parent now may have an additional expense to carry alone, even if the crime that he or she
was convicted for occurred prior to becoming a parent. Convictions can also be a reason to justify divorce. 91 Most significantly,
criminal histories are often part of the ''best interests of the child"
analysis conducted by judges when determining custody rights. 95
Few would dispute that a parent's criminal history is relevant to

88. 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012); see 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-167(b) (1995) (detailing
the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug related offense on eviction proceedings).
89. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5329(a) (2014).
I
90. 43 PA. CODE§ 7.3(b)(6) (2015).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D) (2012).
92. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728 (2010).
93. 55 PA. CODE§ 3041.189(a)(l) (2015).
94. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330l(a)(5) (2010).
95. King, supra note 11, at 30; 23 PA. CONS. STA'l'. ANN.§§ 2511(a)(9), 5329(a) (2014).
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this calculation; however, it is likely that very few criminal defendants realize that a conviction can affect this calculation for
96
their entire life.
3. Citizenship Status and Political Participation
The web of collateral consequences in most jurisdictions can
lead to a permanent separation of ex-offenders from the community regardless of the extent to which a defendant has been rehabilitated.97 Often referred to as "civil death," ex-offenders permanently lose certain social and fundamental rights. 98
Specifically, misdemeanor convictions can disqualify one from
99
the right to ever own a firearm or to enter the military. 100 Such
convictions also can render one ineligible for student loan and
grant assistance. 101 Felony convictions result in automatic deprivation of the right to vote in several jurisdictions. 102 The ability to
serve on a jury or as a witness in a trial may also be restricted after a conviction. 103 Put simply, one's ability to live as a normal citizen or resident may be severely hampered following a conviction.
In Padilla, the Supreme Court gave one particular collateral
consequence credibility: deportation. 101 With each additional legis-

96. King, supra note 11, at 30-31 (describing case in Pennsylvania involving ARD
disposition that affected ability to retain custody).
97. Id. at 32 ("As large numbers of particular groups are stigmatized and disempowered through the reach of collateral consequences, whole communities are marginalized
and excluded from participation in mainstream society."); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Destroying the Village to Save it: The Warfare Analogy (or Dis-analogy?) and the Moral Imperative to Address Collateral Consequences, 54 How. L. J. 501, 511-12 (2011).
98. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death''.· The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1046-49, 1059-64 (2002);
see also Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional
Frarneworh for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. Soc'Y 18, 18-21 (2005) (analyzing whether those with convictions may be a
protected class due to the variety of barriers that come with a conviction).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (prohibiting firearm ownership for individual convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crime); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105
(2014).
100. See AM. BAH Ass'N, INTEHNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
IN FEDERAL LAWS AND HEGULA.TIONS 18 (2009).
101. See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STA'r. ANN. § 5158.2(a)(l) (2006).
102. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 1301(a) (2014).
103. See id. § 59112 (2013) (stating that a conviction can be shown for credibility purposes).
104. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
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lative reform, Congress has adopted stringent standards related
to convictions resulting in broader exclusions for those convicted
of certain offenses. 105 In contrast, from 1917 until 1990, "there was
no such creature as an automatically deportable offense." 106 Rather, sentencing judges exercised broad discretion to not deport
by issuing judicial recommendations against deportation
("JRAD"). 107 Congress, through a series of reforms in the 1990s,
eliminated both this sentencing discretion and the Attorney Gen108
eral's discretion to block deportation.
While rendering deportation automatic was a sea change,
broadening the class of convictions that can result in that consequence is another. Whereas serious, aggravated felonies and heinous crimes of moral turpitude were not tolerated from the start,
the list of offenses has grown. Crimes that do not carry a jail sentence, such as minor controlled substance offenses, can lead to
deportation. 109 As a result, the number of conviction-triggered deportations has skyrocketed. 110 Whether these measures are appropriate as matters of public policy is beyond the scope of this
article, but their existence has serious implications for due process concerns for the unknowing criminal defendant who decides
to plead guilty.

1299, 1301 (2011) (noting how after Padilla, deportation is no longer a "purely civil" proceeding).
105. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) ("While once there was only a
narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to
prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.").
106. Id. at 362.
107. Id. at 361-62.
108. Id. at 363.
109. Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585,
586 (2011).
110. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY 2011: ICE ANNOUNCES
YEAR-END REMOVAL NUMUERS, HIGHLIGHTS Focus ON KEY PRIORITIES INCLUDING
THREATS TO PUilLIC SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http:
//www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2011-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlightsfocus-key-priorities. Nearly 36,000 noncitizens were deported for DUI convictions. Id.

2015]

BEYOND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1157

C. Legal Literacy
As John D. King notes, "[T]he collateral consequences of lowlevel convictions often catch convicted misdemeanants by surprise."111 They are also unapparent to players within the system,,
such as prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are often overburdened with caseloads and working within a process-oriented
adjudicatory system. 112 And if counsel is not present because
counsel is not required, no one within the system has the responsibility to explain such consequences to the unknowing defendant.113 That defendant will more often than not consider it rational to take a plea offer with direct consequences that are tolerable
at the time. As King relays, "Faced with the choice between leaving court with a small fine and a conviction, and facing a trial
weeks or months in the future with the possibility of six months
of incarceration, most people would quickly take the non-jail alternative and consider the matter closed." 114
But the scope of the literacy problem extends beyond the defense. Aside from defense counsel and defendants, judges tend to
know some information about collateral consequences, but not
much. 115 A nationwide survey conducted in the last decade suggests that while discussion of collateral consequences does appear
in state courtrooms, it happens inconsistently and unevenly. 116 In
fact, over 70% of judges who participated in the study stated that
they mention collateral consequences "sometimes" with 38% percent stating that they "rarely" or "never" mention them. 117 In the
111.
112.

King, supra note 11, at 24.
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN

A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 272-74 (1979).

See King, supra note 11, at 4.
Id. at 3-4. The fact that this type of decision is made by defendants without the
assistance of counsel is why many have called for expansion of the right to counsel. See
infra Part III.
115. See generally Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions in American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 15256 (2008) (discussing the results of a survey of state judges).
116. Id. at 148, 152 ("Most judges report that some party-prosecutor, defense attor·
ney, defendant-raises the issue of collateral consequences at least occasionally in their
courtroom.").
117. Id. at 153. Again, the authors interpret the data to show that roughly 60% of judges mention collateral consequences "sometimes" or more. Id. While that may indicate that
someone is mentioning consequences, we still do not know what judges are actually mentioning. Specifically, we do not know whether judges are mentioning specific consequences
113.
114.
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same survey, 57% of judges admitted that such consequences inhibit reentry. 118 As for prosecutors, the study found that 51% of
judges stated that prosecutors rarely or never discuss collateral
119
consequences in the judge's courtroom.
In fairness, this study only covers discussion of collateral consequences generally and in the courtroom. But the fact that the
data does not provide more conclusive evidence of knowledge of
specific collateral consequences amplifies how this is a systemic
literacy issue. Periodic, generic discussions are indeed one aspect
of the literacy problem; however, the content and depth of those
discussions, when and where they happen, and between whom, is
really the type of evidence that is necessary to determine the
depth of illiteracy. While the authors in the study concluded that
awareness of collateral consequences is more visible than many
assume, 120 the study does not offer insight into the depth of that
awareness. And if the players within the system only discuss consequences less than half of the time, one can only surmise how informed and specific the discussion is when it happens.
Hence, notice of collateral consequences may be framed as a
systemic literacy issue. Unawareness of collateral consequences
indirectly supports a criminal system processing countless cases
without regard to their broader effect on individuals and communities. In this regard, any response to the problem must be systemic and heighten legal literacy long-term.

II. THE LAW OF GUILTY PLEAS AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Because guilty pleas are the primary means by which convictions occur within the criminal system, 121 the legal standards for
determining whether a plea is valid are relevant to increasing

or the idea of collateral consequences generally.
118. Id. at 154.
119. Id. at 153.
120. Id. at 161.
121. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 25 tbl.
4.1 (2009) (showing that 94% of felony convictions in state courts in 2006 were the result
of guilty pleas); UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEllOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STA'l'ISTICS tbl.
5.22.2009, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (indicating
that 83, 707 out of 86,314 criminal convictions in federal courts in 2009 were the result of
guilty or no contest pleas).
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awareness of collateral consequences. This section analyzes
whether current doctrine surrounding the validity of pleas contains room for notice of the ever-expanding number of collateral
consequences.

A. Basic Guilty Plea Standards
The seminal case on the validity of guilty pleas is Brady v.
United States. 122 Under Brady, pleas must be voluntary, knowing,
123
and intelligent. Voluntariness is primarily a question of whether coercion-directly or indirectly-is the source of the plea. 124 The
knowing and intelligent aspects of a plea, pursuant to Brady,
hinge on "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." 120 Pleas that are not voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent implicate the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution and may be negated by reviewing courts. 126
In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that pleas must
be entered in front of a judge. 121 The trial judge is tasked with determining the validity of the plea. As long as the record indicates
that the trial court advised the defendant of the rights being
waived and asked whether the defendant intends to plead guilty,
it is likely that a plea will stand. 128 The guilty plea colloquy is also
sufficient for proof of a valid plea. 129 Nevertheless, Boykin and its
progeny stand for the proposition that the courts are institutional
safeguards of the validity of pleas.
Many have tested the meaning of the "knowing" and "intelligent" aspects of pleas. Knowledge of one's rights is one aspect of
the analysis; another is awareness of the consequences of a plea.
As this article has demonstrated, a conviction comes with certain
direct and indirect consequences. But is awareness of collateral

122. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
123. Id. at 748.
124. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 632-33 (1998); see also, e.g., Velez v. New
York, 941 F. Supp. 300, 312 (E.D. N.Y. 1996).
125. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
126. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
127. 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
128. See, e.g., Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 476, 478, 480, 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
129. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 532 N.W.2d 111, 114, 119 (Wis. 1995).
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consequences necessary for a plea to be "knowing" and "intelligent"?

B. Current Jurisprudence on Guilty Pleas and Collateral
Consequences
Under current constitutional law, advice about collateral consequences, from the court or counsel, is generally unnecessary fot
a plea to be valid. This rule stems from Brady, which considers
pleas to be legitimate if "one [is] fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
130
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel." Several lower
courts have used this language to deny claims that unawareness
131
of serious collateral consequences should negate a plea. This
remains common despite the fact that the reference to direct consequences followed the Court's explication of the voluntariness
inquiry, a fact often ignored by courts interpreting the holding of
Brady. 1 a2 Yet, despite being dicta, the Court's statements have led
to the development of an entire body of case law dividing collateral and direct consequences. As a result, most courts do not require advice to the defendant, by the court, about anything but
direct consequences. 133 This rule holds despite the difficulty in deciphering the difference between an automatic collateral consequence and a direct consequence that is not incarceration, such as
a fine. 131 Despite no constitutional requirement of notice in this
area, more than half of the states have adopted statutes or rules
that require courts to notify defendants of deportation consequences. 135

130. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234, 1239-41 (10th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014).
182. Roberts, supra note 22, at 686.
183. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996) ("[E]ntering the
guilty plea without knowledge of the potential for registration and community notification
does not render his plea involuntary and, thus, does not violate the Constitution."); Meyers
v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996) (parole eligibility); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d
781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspension of driver's license); Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d
379, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1964) (loss of right to vote).
134. Roberts, supra note 22, at 679-80.
135. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 382 (2010).
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Advocates for expanding constitutional doctrine to include collateral consequences received a small boost with the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Frye and Padilla. Prior to Padilla, advice about collateral consequences from an attorney was unnecessary for effective assistance of counsel in all contexts. 136 Padilla's
holding changed the rule for deportation and its logic arguably
could be applied to other indirect consequences. 137 Frye also was
decided in the context of effectiveness of counsel at the time of
plea-bargaining. 138 Again, while they do not directly implicate the
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard of Brady and its
progeny, both cases suggest the importance of awareness of collateral consequences in the criminal system. But the effect of
those decisions is arguably minimal because they occurred in the
Sixth Amendment context and the standards mentioned above refer to notice from courts under the Fifth Amendment. 139
1. Padilla v. Kentucky

Padilla gave credibility to the idea that collateral consequences
are relevant to determining the legitimacy of a criminal adjudication, albeit in the effectiveness of counsel context. This distinction
is critical: the fact that Padilla is an ineffectiveness case under
the Sixth Amendment severely limits its applicability to unknowing pleas because litigation post-Padilla would only come in the
form of a collateral attack, which could result in a worse outcome
for a defendant. 1 w

136. Id. at 376 (Alita, J., concurring) (citing Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr.,
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 COHNELL L. REV.
697, 699 (2002) (noting that more than thirty states and eleven federal circuits did not
mandate advice about collateral consequences)).
137. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 376.
138. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
139. Frye and Padilla are ineffective assistance of counsel cases, which is a separate
issue from whether a plea is knowing and intelligent. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Frye, 566
U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, both cases recognize the significance of notice of collateral consequences, and by definition, comprehend
awareness of collateral consequences as a matter of legal literacy. As discussed infra Part
IV, this premise should spur legislative and administrative reform to heighten notice
through institutional actors in addition to counsel, especially given the litigation difficulties that come with ineffectiveness claims. See infra Part III.B.l (discussing the shortcomings of leaning on expansion of the right to counsel as the primary solution).
140. Because the plea offer could be taken away if the defendant were to succeed on the
habeas ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372-73.
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Nevertheless, it is important to understand the spirit of Padilla
when determining how to craft an adequate solution to the problems identified above. In Padilla, the defendant pled guilty to a
drug-trafficking charge after counsel failed to advise him of possible deportation as a result of the conviction and affirmatively
stated that he did not have to worry given his long-term residence
in the country. 141 Unfortunately for Padilla, the drug conviction
made his deportation virtually mandatory. 142
Justice Stevens, author of the majority opinion, emphasized the
unique nature of deportation. 143 While conceding that deportation
was a civil sanction, Justice Stevens refused to draw a clear line
between direct and collateral consequences within the Sixth
Amendment context. 144 Deportation, as a "severe" penalty that
was "intimately related to the criminal process," is arguably in a
class of its own. 145 Notably, Justice Stevens suggested that the
"automatic" nature of the penalty contributed to its uniqueness. 146
These aspects of deportation, coupled with its increased incidence
due to broader statutes and diminished executive discretion, "confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an
integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead
guilty to specified crimes." 147
The majority proceeded to explain what is required of counsel
in a similar situation, ultimately concluding that professional
norms dictate that defense counsel advise a defendant that deportation is likely when the statute is clear in defining the consequences of the conviction.us If the law is unclear, the duty is only
to advise of possible immigration consequences as a result of the
plea. 149 Notably, this rule seems to place a significant burden on

141. Id. at 359.
142. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
143. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357.
144. See id. at 365-66.
145. Id. at 365.
146. See id. at 366.
147. Id. at 363-64.
148. Id. at 368-69.
149. Id. at 369.
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counsel who may not possess the requisite expertise in immigration law necessary to decipher which situation is applicable to a
particular defendant. 150
Justice Alito's concurring opinion suggested a slightly modified
constitutional rule. For Justice Alito, the Sixth Amendment only
requires an attorney to refrain from providing incorrect advice or
to warn of possible adverse consequences without offering specific
recommendations. 151 Justice Alito's rationale for this lower standard for counsel is that the complexity and breadth of collateral
consequences, even beyond the immigration context, weigh
against placing additional demands on counsel:
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of
criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess-and very often do not possess--expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie
152
. area oft rammg
. . an d experience.
.
outs1'de t h e1r

Justice Alito enumerated several other collateral consequences
that could be labeled "serious," such as loss of voting rights and
difficulty finding employment. 153 The logic of the majority opinion
could be extended to those consequences as well, which could
overwhelm counsel. Justice Alito, despite proposing his modified
constitutional rule, seems to long for non-constitutional remedies
in the form of statutes and court rules. 154 Such prophylactic
measures would relieve the burden placed on counsel by a constitutional rule and exist outside of the Sixth Amendment context,
thereby mitigating the need for future litigation. 155

150. For a discussion of this issue beyond the immigration context, see infra Part
III.B.1.
151. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375 (Alito, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 376.
153. Id. It is important to keep in mind that "serious" is a relative term in this context.
A defendant's particular situation will often determine the ability to accept collateral consequences that might be insignificant to another individual.
154. Id. at 382. The majority's rule inadvertently stifles "more promising ways of addressing the underlying problem-such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring
trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences." Id. At the time of Padilla, twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes requiring courts to advise
criminal defendants of possible immigration consequences. Id.
155. Id. at 387.
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2. Missouri v. Frye

In Frye, the Court held that the right to effective assistance of
counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process 156 and that counsel
is required to convey offers to a defendant. 157 Frye, charged with
driving with a revoked license for the fourth time, never received
two plea offers conveyed to his counsel. 158 He ultimately submitted an open guilty that resulted in three years of incarceration. 15 n
Upon learning that his counsel had received an offer that would
have resulted in only ninety days of incarceration, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel. 160

Frye, like Padilla, arises in the ineffectiveness of counsel context and therefore deals primarily with Sixth Amendment standards rather than the validity of guilty pleas or the legitimacy of
collateral consequences. 161 It also contains significant limitations
given the demands of Strickland v. Washington for habeas relief.162 But it reinforces and lends credibility to the notion that legal standards-constitutional or not-should be cognizant of the
163
reality that guilty pleas dominate the criminal system.

156. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _, _ 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (holding that the
right applies to "all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings" including plea bargaining);
see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (finding that the guilty plea is a
critical stage).
157. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
158. Id. at 1404.
159. Id. at 1404-05.
160. Id. at 1404.
161. See id. at 1404, 1406 (explaining that the challenge was not to advice pertaining to
the accepted guilty plea, but rather other aspects of the representation); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment controls regardless
of whether deportation is or is not a collateral consequence).
162. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring the defendant to prove that counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense).
163. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 ("The State's contentions are neither illogical nor without some persuasive force, yet they do not suffice to overcome a simple reality.
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas .... The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to
the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical
stages."). The Court proceeded to cite Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("That is what plea bargaining is. It is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."). Id.
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The primary issue in Frye was whether counsel might be deficient for not conveying the terms of a plea offer to a defendant,
especially if those terms are favorable. 164 The Court answered in
the affirmative because the plea-bargaining realities of the criminal system make an informed plea, with the aid of counsel, essential to the legitimacy of the process. 165 As Justice Kennedy concluded, "In today's criminal justice system, therefore, the
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial,
is almost always the critical point for a defendant." 166
Thus, Frye reinforces the significance of notice and how its absence can lead to a viable habeas claim under the Sixth Amendment. In this sense, it follows the theme of notice running
through Padilla. Both cases suggest that effectiveness of counsel
and the legitimacy of pleas hinge on how well-informed a defendant is, by counsel, when making a decision about whether to
plead guilty. 167 Hence, both decisions constitutionalized notice. rns
In Padilla, notice was linked to collateral consequences, albeit only with respect to immigration. 169 In Frye, notice is linked to the
plea bargaining process itself. 110 Because both cases concede the
heightened significance of the guilty plea to the administration of
the criminal system and involve effectiveness of counsel claims,
commentators and scholars have called for an expansion of the
164. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
165. Id. at 1407-08.
166. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy also states: "[C]riminal defendants
require effective counsel during plea negotiations. 'Anything less ... might deny a defendant effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would
help him."' Id. at 1407-08 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)).
As Stephanos Bibas notes, Padilla marked the first time that the Court began to regulate
plea bargaining as the main aspect of the criminal justice process instead of the right to a
jury trial. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1118-19.
167. See Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 ("[A]s a general rule, defense counsel
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused."); Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1120 ("With Padilla, the Court has now begun to
interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to impose meaningful
safeguards on the plea process.").
168. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1118 (noting
how Padilla "marks a watershed in the Court's approach to regulating plea bargains").
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Frye, suggests the same idea, when criticizing the Court's
methodology: "[I]t does present the necessity of confronting the serious difficulties that
will be created by constitutionalization of the plea-bargaining process." Frye, 566 U.S. at
_, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359-60 (2010).
170. See Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
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right to counsel to ensure legitimate pleas, regulate the plea.
bargaining market, and alleviate unforeseen collateral conse.
quences. 171 Part III evaluates these claims to determine whether
expansion of the right to counsel, alone, is sufficient to alleviate
the effect of collateral consequences on the pleading defendant.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS A SOLU'rION
A criminal justice system dominated by the twin realities of
guilty pleas and increasing collateral consequences has led to
ample calls for expansion of the right to counsel. 112 Some have
called for an expansion of current constitutional doctrine, whereas others have focused their efforts on legislative action. 173 The
assumption underlying these efforts is that counsel is the silver
bullet necessary to alleviate the significant effects of such consequences.174 Counsel, it is said, will not only increase the likelihood
that a defendant knows the indirect ramifications of taking a plea
deal, but will possibly manage to obtain a better plea deal altogether.175
In order to evaluate the merits of this position, this section will
begin with a discussion of current doctrine regarding the right to
counsel. After discussing the federal standard as well as a few notable state standards that go beyond the federal minimum, this
section will evaluate the likelihood that the right can be expanded, either doctrinally or statutorily. Additionally, it will analyze
the claim that expansion of the right to counsel, alone, will mitigate the effect of collateral consequences, especially in a postPadilla world.

171. See, e.g., King, supra note 11, at 47.
172. See generally id. at 2-3, 22 (noting that because 70% of misdemeanor defendants
plea guilty and the collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction have increased,
the right to effective assistance of counsel should be extended to those defendants as well).
173. See id. at 342 (arguing for an expansion of the constitutional doctrine); Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 33, at 1120 (stating that legislation is
necessary).
174. See generally Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at
1120, 1158 (contending that, even with the necessity of legislation to regulate the plea
bargain process under a model of consumer protection law, the advice of counsel remains
of vital importance).
175. See King, supra note 11, at 24, 34, 44-45.
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A. The Scope of the Current Right to Counsel
The right to the assistance of counsel finds its ongm in the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence." 176
There is support to the idea that the original intention of the
Sixth Amendment was to afford the right to retain counsel at
one's own expense. 177 Notably, the guarantee was broader than
the English common law, which actually disallowed the assistance of a lawyer for serious crimes. 178
1. Federal Constitutional Standards

The current rules regarding the right to counsel under the
Federal Constitution stem from Scott v. Illinois, which generally
held that the right to counsel extends to defendants charged with
offenses that result in actual incarceration. 179 Decades prior to
Scott, the Court began explicating the content of the right to
counsel in Powell v. Alabama. 180 In Powell, nine African American
men charged with rape, a capital offense at the time, were not
appointed counsel; all were convicted at trials that occurred in
one day. 181 The Court held that due process required the presence
of counsel in state capital cases because the absence of counsel
left the unrepresented defendant helpless in the hyper-technical
field oflaw. 182

176. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
177. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) ("There is considerable doubt
that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights,
contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution
in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense."); Alfredo Garcia, The Right
to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 4142 (1991).
178. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 4 (2002) ("The
assistance of counsel was seen as an impediment to efficient and successful prosecution
and punishment.").
179. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
180. 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932).
181. Id. at 45-46, 49-50.
182. Id. at 68-69, 71 ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
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A few years later, the Court opted for a bright-line rule in the
federal context, holding that the federal government had to provide counsel to any defendant facing criminal charges. 183 It took
three decades for this right to extend to state criminal proceedings beyond the guarantees in Powell. Of course, that occurred in
the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright, which established the
right to government-provided counsel in any serious case. 184 The
doctrine rested on the idea of reciprocal fairness: a fair trial, given the "vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defend-

ants accused of crime," required the presence of counsel.

185

The

court maintained that the right to counsel was "fundamental and
essential to a fair trial." 186 Despite this strong language in Gideon,
the contours of the right remained unknown until a decade later. 1s1
The Court extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor prose188
cutions involving actual incarceration in Argersinger v. Hamlin.
For the Court, extension of the right to counsel to such criminal
prosecutions placed the protection on the same plane as the rest
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees, which departed from English common law in their breadth. 189 For the Court, ensuring a fair
trial through the presence of counsel was just as important in socalled petty cases, stating that "[w]e are by no means convinced
that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less
complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more."rno Interestingly, Justice Powell foresaw many of the co~
ceptual difficulties confronting the narrow rules outlined by the
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.").
183. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.").
184. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[R)eason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."). Notably,
Gideon involved a felony charge, a trend continued in the cases to follow. Id. at 336-37.
185. Id. at 344.
186. Id. at 342 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1992)).
187. See King, supra note 11, at 11 (describing how states adapted differently to the
Gideon decision).
188. See 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
189. See id. at 27-30.
190. Id. at 33.
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Court in the right to counsel cases. mi Justice Powell favored a
more flexible approach that was cognizant of a variety of consequences beyond incarceration. 192 Indeed, Justice Powell suggested
the importance of collateral consequences: "The consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served
under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label
'petty."' 1n:i
Despite Justice Powell's alternative approach, the Court reaffirmed the Argersinger holding in Scott, which involved a misdemeanor theft prosecution that resulted in a $50 fine for the defendant and no period of incarceration. 194 Justice Rehnquist, who
had concurred with Justice Powell in Argersinger, wrote the majority opinion. 195 For the Court, counsel only needed to be appointed in cases that resulted in actual incarceration because the loss
196
of liberty was an especially unique consequence. Notably, Justice Rehnquist chose not to mention collateral consequences in his
opinion despite his earlier concurrence with Justice Powell in Argersinger.l!n Nevertheless, "the decision in Scott essentially froze
the evolution of the right to appointed counsel." 198
From a doctrinal perspective, the right to counsel jurisprudence contains serious deficiencies. As Justice Brennan noted in
his dissent, it is quite odd to ask judges to decide in advance of
191. See King, supra note 11, at 13 (noting how Justice Powell's opinion "is prescient
for its focus on the potential impact of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction
and for its argument that courts should account for these consequences in evaluating 'seri·
ousness' in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel").
192. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 447-48 (Powell, J., concurring).
193. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 48 n.11 (noting collateral consequences such
as stigma, loss of a driver's license, loss of public office, disqualification from a profession,
and loss of pension rights).
194. Scott v. Illinois, 4,10 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
195. Id. at 367; see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44.
196. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74. Justice Powell concurred, albeit reluctantly, and emphasized the flexible approach that he called for in Argersinger. See id. at 374 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan authored a vehement dissent that labeled the majority opinion as inconsistent with precedent and perversely incentivizing the judicial system to play
legislature. See id. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 373. ("[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.").
198. King, supra note 11, at 15.
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trial whether incarceration will be the penalty. 199 Further, drawing a line at incarceration appears arbitrary given the text of the
Sixth Amendment, which refers to "all criminal prosecutions."200
It is arguably more difficult to apply than drawing the line at the
threat of incarceration, which is governed by legislative decisionmaking. The Court also dismisses the significance of fairness in
lower-level cases despite the fact that the actual prosecution of
such a case can be nearly the same procedurally. 201 But most significantly for the collateral consequences issue, the jurisprudence
fails to account for the myriad effects that a petty offense conviction can have on an unrepresented defendant. The increased effect of collateral consequences since Scott has magnified this
oversight. 202
2. Right to "Effective" Counsel
Although the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment is defined by the imposition of actual incarceration
and thereby only exists for a subset of criminal defendants, the
right more broadly contains the guarantee of "effective" counsel. 203
In other words, an attorney must adequately prepare the case,
whether for trial, in plea negotiations, 201 or some other aspect.
The Court's holding in Strickland governs whether counsel
may be considered effective or not. Strickland, by its facts, involved counsel's actions at trial and in capital sentencing proceed-

199. Scott, 440 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also King, supra note 11, at 15
("Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, judges in low-level cases are invited to
decide in some respect the sentence before the trial.").
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
201. See King, supra note 11, at 15-16 ("With rare exception, the rules of evidence and
procedure are the same, and the complexity of trials is not necessarily different.").
202. See id. at 17 (describing how the "era of greatly expanded collateral consequences"
followed Scott, which was precisely the worst time given how right to counsel jurisprudence was frozen).
203. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
204. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1126 ("The Court put great faith in competent defense counsel as the only substantial safeguard. As long as lawyers offered competent advice, even if they turned out to be wrong in hindsight, defendants supposedly could forecast whether pleas served their self-interests. That romanticized vision, however, ignored
the workloads, underfunding, and agency costs that beset defense lawyers and the difficulties of proving incompetence on undeveloped plea records.").
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ings. 20 " The Court announced two components to the test for effectiveness: poor attorney performance and prejudice to the defendant as a result of the attorney's actions. 206 The first prong, whether an attorney acted deficiently or not, is guided by objective
standards of reasonableness. 207 Despite its objective component,
courts are required to be deferential to counsel's actions. 208 The
second aspect of the test is also difficult to demonstrate. The defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 209 In
the plea context, that means the defendant must show that he
would not have plead guilty but for attorney incompetence. 210
Post-Frye, it also can mean that an attorney was ineffective for
failing to convey a good offer or provide proper advice related to
the offer. 211
Because the Sixth Amendment requires "effective" counsel, expansion of the right to counsel necessarily would result in incorporation of all "effectiveness" jurisprudence into the everyday
practice of defense counsel. As explained above, in a post-Padilla
world, "effectiveness" can possibly include collateral consequences.212 Thus, expansion of the right to counsel would not operate in
a vacuum. It may be a prophylactic measure designed to combat
pleas that are not cognizant of collateral consequences. But with
all of the "effectiveness" jurisprudence coming along as well, is
this prophylactic solution the most appropriate way to address
the issue? Any evaluation of the possible effect of expansion of the

205. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
206. Id. at 687.
207. Id. at 687-88.
208. See id. at 689. As long as an attorney stays somewhat close to professionally responsible conduct, a court is likely to find that the performance was not deficient. See id.
at 689-91.
209. Id. at 694.
210. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
211. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S._, _, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (holding that
the right applies to "all 'critical stages" of the criminal proceedings, which includes plea
bargaining); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385, (2012) (discussing the Strichland "prejudice" standard as it applies to plea offer rejections).
212. See supra Part II.B.1. The astute reader will recall that Padilla did not decide the
question of prejudice for the defendant and, in fact, left it to lower courts to decipher what
that actually means in practice in the immigration context.
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procedural right to counsel must be cognizant of the requirements
of "effectiveness" as a substantive aspect of the right.
B. Shortcomings as Solution
1. Litigating Habeas Claims Based on Effectiveness: A Tough

Standard to Meet

Padilla was largely considered a victory for criminal defendants.213 But does it really address the underlying issue of collateral consequences literacy? This section examines whether Padilla, by broadening the responsibilities of counsel, will heighten
awareness of collateral consequences if it is extended beyond the
immigration context.
The first consequence of Padilla is that it arguably confined
collateral consequence jurisprudence to the effectiveness of counsel arena. While Padilla rightfully imposed an additional responsibility on counsel representing a defendant possibly facing deportation, it also laid the groundwork for a piecemeal approach to
notice of other collateral consequences through counsel. In other
words, because notice of collateral consequences was recognized
as an aspect of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which in
turn is litigated through effectiveness claims, expansion of such
notice will likely have to occur within the same constitutional
context. As a practical matter, even if counsel were to be required
to go beyond Padilla, it would take years to determine, piecemeal,
how far counsel must go. And assuming that most cases will not
reach the Supreme Court, clarity will remain most likely nothing
but a desired outcome of the defense bar. That sort of timetable
fails to account for the pressing problem that collateral consequences may impose on defendants currently deciding whether to
plead guilty. If notice of collateral consequences poses as large a
problem as many have indicated, then should the legal system be
content to attack the problem through the hyper-technical effectiveness of counsel jurisprudence?
This might be labeled as a pace problem for the development of
doctrine. The problem is even more apparent when one considers

213.
sel).

See King, supra note 11, at 37 (conferring a right to effective assistance of coun-
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the difficulty of establishing a viable ineffectiveness of counsel
claim once a defendant chooses to bring it. The majority in Padilla conceded that the test for ineffectiveness in Strickland and
its progeny is a difficult standard to meet. 214 The Court also did
not decide the question of prejudice in Padilla, instead opting to
remand the case to the lower court, thereby leaving an aspect of
215
the law undeveloped. As noted above, the first prong of Strickland is highly deferential to professional norms and the actions of
defense counsel; the second component requires clear causation
between the actions of defense counsel and the defendant's deci216
sion to plead guilty. In fairness, lower courts have extended Padilla to a few consequences that were formerly considered by
courts to be entirely collateral, such as sex offender registration, 217
and estoppel in a civil suit. 218 But this expansion of the duties of
counsel has not necessarily resulted in viable ineffectiveness
claims; defendants are still losing those fights. 219 In fact, some
courts have allowed guilty plea warnings to mitigate the prejudice necessary to a successful Strichland claim. 220
Thus, using effectiveness of counsel jurisprudence to heighten
notice of collateral consequences poses two problems. First, it is
an incremental solution, at best, and leaves the addition of significant collateral consequences to the inchworm pace of litigating
habeas claims. Second, even if the reasoning of Padilla were extended to other consequences, the deferential Strichland standard
does not guarantee, by any stretch of the imagination, that notice
will actually increase. Strichland can insulate defense counsel
from changing best practices. Padilla itself conceded this point
214. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
215. See id. at 374-75.
216. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985).
217. See, e.g., In re C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div .•July 23, 2010) (finding ineffective assistance when attorney failed to advise juvenile about lifetime registration); see also State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56, 64-65 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2007) (finding ineffectiveness when attorney failed to advise about sex offender registration). Edwards occurred pre-Padilla. Other courts have found the opposite. See State v.
Emblad, Al0-444, 2011 WL 9148 at *3, *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2011).
218. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 536, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (noting ineffectiveness when attorney failed to advise how guilty plea would affect civil liability).
219. See Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings
on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L. J. 944, 975-84
(2012) (noting how in the majority of cases within her study, courts found the plea colloquy
to be significant when refusing to find prejudice).
220. See id. at 979.
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and advocates for increased, system-wide notice of collateral consequences in response to the Court's warning.
2. Complexity of Collateral Consequences and the Practical
Demands of Padilla

The more obvious problem with relying on the expansion of the
right to counsel post-Padilla can be characterized as one of volume: how will attorneys possibly know all of the consequences
relevant to the defendant before them? As Margaret Love has
stated, "Padilla recognizes the need to make participants in a
criminal case aware of non-criminal 'collateral' penalties that are
221
frequently a crime's most serious punishment." With that, an
immense education awaits defense counsel who wish to remain
effective, and this would only expand exponentially with new additions to the doctrine. 222 The permutations in the immigration
field resulting from pleas to different criminal charges are already complicated. 223 And knowledge of those complexities only
224
comes with time and significant resource expenditures.
In short, "the brunt of the burden ... falls on defense counsel."220 It may be more appropriate to say that the entire burden
falls on defense counsel. And that burden is heavy indeed. Counsel would be essentially tasked with determining all of the consequences relevant to a particular situation. 226 Comprehensive ad-

221. Margaret C. Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. Lours U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2011).
222. Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on
Implementation and Future Directions, 45 New ENG. L. REV. 353, 357 (2011) ("There is a
very large educational task ahead as a result of Padilla.").
223. Id. at 358-59 (describing several examples of how different charges would dramatically alter immigration consequences).
224. Id. at 361 ("The implications of the decision are nonetheless clear: immigrationrelated advice is required; that advice is complex and will require significant resources be
devoted to it; and those resources must be devoted."). Some public defender associations
have taken to hiring immigration attorneys or assigning current attorneys to become experts in the field of immigration consequences. The more likely result is that underresourced legal aid organizations will attempt to coordinate with defense counsel, which
presents its own challenges. Id. at 361-62.
225. Id. at 361.
226. See generally Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FOHDHAM URB.
L.J. 1067, 1067 (2004).
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vice would require research beyond the traditional capability of
an individual attorney. 221
However, many public defenders are already overburdened due
to the sheer volume of cases requiring attention. Maximum caseload standards are rare for indigent defense attorneys. 228 This
high volume can lead to very serious consequences, like the unnecessary deprivation of a defendant's liberty due to the sheer inability of an attorney to research a minimum sentence or convey
an offer to a defendant. 229 It also can drive a wedge between the
interests of a defendant and defense counsel. 230 Public defenders'
practices are often in triage mode. In an era of overburdened defense counsel, is it possible that additional responsibilities would
actually render it more difficult to notify defendants of the consequences of their pleas? 231 When conceptualized as a systemic issue, attempting to increase notice solely through counsel is questionable at best.
The National Institute of Justice's attempt to catalogue collateral consequences by jurisdiction is one response to this problem. 232 Spearheaded by the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA,
the project attempts to build an "inventory of any provision in the
state constitution, statutes, and administrative rules that create
collateral sanctions and authorize disqualifications with citations

227. See Gabriel J. Chin, Mahing Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675, 685 (2011) [hereinafter Chin, Malling Padilla Practical].
228. THE CONST. PROJECT, NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED:
AMEIUCA'S CONTINUING NEGLEC'l' OF OUR CONSTI'l'UTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 67 (Apr.
2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
229. Id. at 68-69.
230. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J.
1179, 1180 (1975) (examining the core assumption that the presence of defense counsel
adds legitimacy to pleas and concluding that the "current conceptions of the defense attorney's role are often more romanticized than real"). Alschuler's seminal article on the practices of overburdened defense attorneys shed light on how defense counsel, while often
helpful in the administration of justice, also can be complicit in the unjust aspects of a
plea-bargaining market. He describes how too often it is the case that defense counsel
plays the role of the professional pleader in a system that provides opportunities for dishonest lawyers. See id. at 1185-98.
231. Derek Wikstrom, "No Logical Stopping Point": The Consequences of Padilla v.
Kentucky's Inevitable Expansion, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (2012) ("If Padilla warnings are ultimately required for all collateral consequences of a guilty plea, criminal lawyers will have a difficult time effectively assisting any of their clients.").
232. See ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description.
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and short descriptions." 2 '3:3 The project- aims to allow states to
comply with the protections of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act. 2:i 1 That act recognized the disorganized
nature of collateral consequences in the federal code and state
laws, which rendered awareness nearly impossible for defense
counsel and other participants in the criminal justice system. 235
The result of the project is an online, searchable database that
lists the collateral consequences, whether automatic or discretionary, implicated by a particular criminal charge.
The ABA's project is commendable and will undeniably assist
defense attorneys in particular circumstances, and over time. But
while more resources may be available, the volume problem will
always remain as legislatures continue to enact new collateral
consequences and courts expand Padilla. The burden will rest
almost entirely on defense counsel and unaware defendants will
rely entirely on the competence and zeal of defense counsel. 236
Other actors within the system will not be made any more aware
of the collateral consequences that should affect calculations of
due process in a system dominated by pleas.
3. Budgetary and Resource Issues
Even if the doctrinal and practical issues identified above could
be addressed, resource deficiencies remain and expansion of the
right to counsel would remain subject to the political will within
legislatures. The Court has not expanded the constitutional right
2
to counsel since Scott. '31 This leaves expansion to legislatures and
state constitutions. While a few states already go beyond the re233. Id.
234. See id. (indicating that the project helps states save time and money); see, e.g.,
Missouri v. Petterson, 780 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (range of punishment);
Deutscher v. Nevada, 601 P.2d 407, 414 (Nev. 1979) (ability to waive the right to counsel);
Wilkins v. Maryland, 245 A.2d 80, 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (right to counsel). Notice
how the sentencing information relates to direct consequences. While a defendant's inperson presence at an arraignment often can be waived, or his appearance entirely, the
information must find its way to the defendant.
235. See ABA, NI CCC, supra note 48, at Project Description ("Of particular relevance in
the present context is the fact that collateral consequences are scattered throughout the
codebooks and frequently unknown even to those responsible for their administration and
enforcement.").
236. See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms,
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150 (2012) [hereinafter Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining].
237. See King, supra note 11, at 6, 15.
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quirements of Scott and afford a broader right to counsel, 238 implementation of the federal guarantees remains a work in progress.239 The right heralded in Gideon remains, to some degree, an
unfunded mandate and there is no guarantee that doctrinal expansion of the scope of the right would change that reality. 210 Yet
there are few, if any, public defender organizations that would refuse additional resources.
Generally, financial support for indigent counsel in America
lags behind that in other developed countries. 211 Twenty years after Gideon, only 1.5% of total expenditures for the entire criminal
justice system went to defense services. 212 Funding has increased,
but remains insufficient. 21 '3 In 2005, the fifty states combined
spent $5.3 billion on indigent defense. 211 This funding is spent in
vastly different ways because the Court has not mandated how
the right to counsel must be implemented. 215 In most states, the
216
state government funds a particular indigent defense program.
A substantial number still shift financial burdens to counties
within the state, which can result in local inequities based on per
•
•
2-17
capita income.
Unsurprisingly, indigent defense is not the most popular project to fund, especially in a time of economic uncertainty. Thus,
funding sources are often specialized, which also results in un238. See, e.g., OH. CONST. art. I§ 11; Gaffey v. State, 637 P.2d 634, 636 (1981) (indicating that the right to counsel exists for any criminal defendant regardless of whether imprisonment is imposed, even including a right to counsel for minor traffic infractions).
239. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After 'Gideon,'
A'l'LANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013 11:09 AM) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/
03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counscl-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ ("Over the intervening half-century, Congress and state lawmakers consistently have refused to fund
public defenders' offices adequately. And, as it has become more conservative since 1963,
the United States Supreme Court has refused to force legislators to do so.").
240. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and
the Neer], for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 8-13 (2004).
241. See id. at 922-24 (comparing legal aid in England with the United States); see also
AM. BAH Ass'N, CHIMINAL .JUSTICE IN CmsIS: A REPORT TO THE AMEHICAN PEOPLE AND THE
AMEHICAN BAH ON CHIMINAL JUS'l'ICE IN 'l'HE UNI'l'ED S'l'A'l'ES: SOME MYTHS, SO!v!E
REALITIES, AND SO!v!E QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 39-44 (1988).
242. See AM. BAR Ass'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 1
(1983).
243. Id. at 7.
244. Id. at 7-8.
245. Id.
246. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 228, at 54.
247. Id. at 54-55.
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predictability. 218 Funds also can be collected by increasing costs
elsewhere in the criminal system, which can lead to crippling fi.
nancial collateral consequences for the indigent. 219 Furthermore
expansion of the right to counsel in non-criminal contexts has un.'
fortunately drained resources that were once allocated for crimi.
nal defense services. 250
The political will to financially support defense programs has
deteriorated as the economy has struggled. 251 Several states de.
creased the amount of financial support in the mid-2000s. 252 In
2009, twenty-two of thirty-seven states facing budget shortfalls
were solely responsible for funding statewide defense programs. 253
When the belt must be tightened, defense programs are one of the
first programs to go by the wayside. 254 Most significant for this article is the reality that the inequities between budgets for professional prosecutors and for defense programs remain despite funding difficulties overall, which renders the Court's statements in
Argersinger about fairness somewhat hollow. 255
4. Summary: More "Represented" Defendants, but the Problems
and Burdens Remain
There is no question that expansion of the right to counsel
would allow more defendants to receive counsel. Expansion also
would, by definition, incorporate effectiveness of counsel jurisprudence into the equation. As combating collateral consequences
illiteracy is the main objective, it is arguable that forging a path
solely through the Sixth Amendment is inadequate. Defense programs are already overwhelmed with bloated caseloads and insufficient funding. Mandating expansion of the right to counsel does
not resolve this resource problem, and perhaps could exacerbate
248. Id. at 57 & n.50 (describing how Wisconsin created a program earmarking funds
for indigent defense, with a projection of $7 million, and raised less than $100,000).
249. See id. at 57-58.
250. Id. at 74.
251. HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SrmVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 6-7 (2010).
252. See id. at 59.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 59-60 (describing state programs that sacrificed staff and other resources
due to trimmed state budgets).
255. Id. at 61-62 (discussing significant disparities in overall budget, grants, and salaries in various states); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33-37 (1972).
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it. In other words, an expanded right could simply result in an
unfilled promise.
But even assuming that the funding and resource deficiencies
could be addressed, attempting to increase notice of collateral
consequences through expansion of Padilla is tantamount to attacking an iceberg with a single ice pick. While many are hopeful
for the expansion of Padilla to other collateral consequences, the
process will be incremental at best. Differences of opinion between circuits and states will remain. Clarity is unlikely. And
even if Padilla is expanded, the heightened Strickland standard
potentially mitigates any gains.
These realities expose reliance on Padilla and its progeny as
the primary means for combating unawareness of collateral consequences. At its root, the issue is one of legal illiteracy that is
present throughout the criminal system amongst various participants involved in crafting justice. Therefore, any solution to the
problem must go beyond the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment
to reach other components of the justice system. Expansion of the
right to counsel as a prophylactic measure is a step in the right
direction, but it is not enough and exempts too many players, all
while increasing burdens on perpetually overwhelmed defense
counsel. Hence, a broader solution is necessary: notice must be
extended beyond the duties of counsel in order to effectively educate prosecutors, judges, defendants, defense counsel, police officers, and any other individuals that are involved in crafting justice. Extending notice also will bring additional obligations for
these players. The next section suggests possible avenues for beginning this task and calls for further study, specifically drawing
on solutions to illiteracy in other fields.
IV. SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS THAT ENSURE NOTICE OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES

Because expansion of the right to counsel is likely insufficient
for combating the problem of collateral consequences illiteracy,
any solution must account for the various players involved in the
administration of criminal justice. This part argues for increased
involvement from the two most visible players: judges and prosecutors. Because prosecutors are essentially the "architects" of
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criminal proceedings, 256 it is only fitting that they contribute to
greater awareness of indirect consequences for individual defendants, the system, and themselves. Furthermore, with the exception of the rare case that proceeds to trial and requires judicial
gatekeeping, trial judges are heavily involved in the processing of
guilty pleas. 257 As vital guardians of due process, they are in a
unique position to contribute to systemic literacy. Because both
prosecutors and judges do not relate to the defendant in terms of
advocacy, this article calls for disclosure-like obligations from
both at various stages of the process that already exists.

A. Formalizing Notice from the Judiciary
In a system dominated by pleas, there are two encounters between judges and defendants that are ripe for notice of collateral
consequences: arraignment and the moment of the entry of a
guilty plea. Both command undivided attention from the defendant, primarily because they represent the beginning and the end
of a prosecution.
1. Arraignment
Arraignment, whether preliminary or formal, is the moment
when a defendant appears before a judge and is apprised of pending charges filed against the defendant. 258 It involves an acknowledgment of jurisdiction, information about the offenses charged,
and a request for entry of a plea. Again, notice is the primary undercurrent at this stage, which is a "critical stage" of the prosecution.259 Most state arraignment procedures require judges to inform a defendant of certain rights, such as the right to counsel, as
well as possible sentences. 260

256. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
257. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(3)-(5) (addressing the involvement of a trial judge
in the acceptance or denial of a plea agreement).
258. See generally Arraignment in the Court of Common Pleas, DEL. STATE CTS.,
http://courts.delaware.gov/help/proceedings/ccp_crarraignment.stm (last visited Apr. 3,
2015).
259. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961).
260. See, e.g., Missouri v. Petterson, 780 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (range of punishment); Deutscher v. Nevada, 601 P.2d 407 (Nev. 1979) (right to counsel); Wilkins v.
Maryland, 245 A.2d 80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (right to counsel). Notice how the sentencing information relates to direct consequences. While a defendant's in-person presence
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The information received by a defendant at arraignmentwhether in person or after waiving an appearance-can make a
defendant aware of what may result in the event of a conviction.
Hearing the possible collateral consequences from a judge and including them in court paperwork attached to the charging documents can heighten individual literacy and cause a defendant to
become aware, from the start, of considerations that should be
part of the guilty plea calculus. In other words, notice of collateral
consequences provides an additional frame for the defendant to
view the case through. Such notice would likely provoke conversations with defense counsel that may otherwise not occur due to
the difficulties that were articulated above. Defendantsespecially those encountering the system for the first timewould have information that allows them to be proactive rather
than reactive given the likelihood of a plea offer in the pipeline.
Having this information come from the court also adds an element of legitimacy to the reality of those consequences. It selfinforms the judge and also may inform a prosecutor who happens
to be present. The information can become a vital aspect of a defendant's thought process simply by being more present.
Admittedly, one criticism of adding notice to this phase of the
process is that arraignments have become largely rote procedures.261 While they may be rote for some, they certainly are not
for all, especially the defendant unfamiliar with the criminal system and who retains awe for the judiciary. Furthermore, rote or
not, it is undeniable that the current aspects of the arraignment
process have heightened literacy with respect to the right to
counsel and the right to a trial. It is not unreasonable to suppose
that notice of collateral consequences would result in a similar effect across the board.
Another possible criticism is that it is impossible to predict the
number of collateral consequences applicable to a particular defendant at this phase of the game. But this criticism mistakes the
judicial role at the time of arraignment. Judges are not tasked
with giving individual advice; rather, they are tasked with giving
at an arraignment often can be waived, or his appearance entirely, the information must
find its way to the defendant.
261. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 271, 295 (2009).
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individuals information. And information about collateral conse262
quences is often charge-based rather than individual-based. In
other words, technological advancements make it possible to index consequences as they relate to charges. While the number
may be high and render in-person notice administered by a judge
potentially impractical, it is foreseeable that a catalog of the possible consequences could be attached to the charging information.263
A related criticism stems from the fact that some collateral
261
consequences are automatic and others are discretionary,
thereby making it too difficult to provide notice in a particular
situation. Admittedly, this is a more difficult problem to grapple
with than the former. However, it also assumes too much responsibility for a judge. Rather, arraignment could be reserved for
mentioning those collateral consequences that could result by op·
eration of law. Notice as to discretionary collateral consequences,
such as in the field of employment, could be present, but less specific. Because the goal is heightening systemic literacy, mere
mention of the discretionary consequences will likely raise a defendant's eyebrow as he or she approaches resolution of the case.
Put simply, heightening awareness of collateral consequences at
the arraignment phase plants the seed for future consideration of
those consequences. It also will increase judicial awareness,
which could be helpful when a judge is evaluating the due process
standards associated with a plea that occurs later in the case.
2. Inclusion of "Automatic" Consequences in Pleas

As described above, courts are already tasked with ensuring
that guilty pleas meet certain due process standards under the
262. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
263. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note 227 at 685 ("[I]t is perfectly reasonable to anticipate that the legal system, somehow, will ~ee to it that research is done
that can be shared with all participants in the criminal justice system."). The "index" could
be fully disseminated in the charging documents or court paperwork given to the defendant. An abbreviated version that identifies the most prevalent collateral consequences associated with particular charges could be delivered in person by the judge. Which consequences to include in the in-person communication would be jurisdiction specific and
based on analyses conducted on that subject in each jurisdiction. In other words, each
state could study which charges are most frequently resulting in convictions and which
collateral consequences correlate to those charges.
264. See ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description.

d
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Fifth Amendment. Adding notice of consequences at the time of a
plea can have similar effects to increased notice at the time of arraignment because defendants will be reminded of the consequences of their decision prior to formalizing ancl living with it
beyond the withdrawal period.
Jenny Roberts suggested as much when considering the practicability of adding notice to pleas:
Courts are already charged with ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Just as defense counsel are able to
ask a few more questions to determine if counseling about one or
more collateral consequences is necessary, so too can the courts
make minor adjustments to their plea allocution processes to protect
265
such important rights.

In other words, guilty plea colloquies-both written and with
the judiciary-can be instruments of increasing literacy. Interestingly, this arguably might heighten literacy and the knowingness
of pleas at a lower cost than leaning on defense counsel. 266 More
importantly, post-Padilla, it would recognize the complementary
guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 267 Whereas defense counsel can level the playing field strategically, the judiciary can at least ensure that all parties are as informed as they
should be. Padilla resisted importing the collateral consequences
rule into the Sixth Amendment context; if awareness of such consequences truly is a systemic literacy issue, it makes sense to involve courts in the effort.
Recall that Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Padilla,
suggested as much when referring to creative, legislative ways to
address the issue. 268 In fact, the ABA standards already urge
courts and legislatures "to make notice of particular sanctions a
condition of a valid plea."269 And at the time Padilla was decided,

265. Roberts, supra note 22, at 699.
266. Wikstrom, supra note 231, at 370 & n.131 (citing Justice Scalia's dissent for the
Proposition that the Court could have leaned on Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendtnent to require notice of collateral consequences in the guilty plea colloquy).
267. See Lang, supra note 219, at 952-54.
268. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 382-83 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
269. Love, supra note 221, at 118, 119 & n.164; AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA 81'ANDARDS FOR
C!UMJNAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF
CONVICTED PERSONS 28 (3d ed. 2004).
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some states had added notice of immigration consequences to the
plea co 11oquy. 270
Aside from the due process aspect of this proposal, tasking
judges with notice will contribute to systemic literacy. Like at the
arraignment phase, judges will become more aware. Similarly,
whereas prosecutors may be absent at arraignment, they are
never absent from the moment a plea is entered. Hearing judges
announce the pertinent collateral consequences, on the record, as
they relate to a particular charge, will cumulatively heighten
prosecutorial awareness and possibly lead to more appropriate
plea offers depending on other considerations related to a case. 211
In fairness, many of the same criticisms that apply to adding
notice requirements at arraignment apply to adding them to
guilty plea colloquies. 272 The volume, depth, and mechanical problems are the same, although arguably linking consequences to
charges rather than individual circumstances avoids the issue in
273
most cases. That approach also would preserve the distinction
between the judiciary's informative role and defense counsel's ad211
vocacy role. Blurring those roles would be inappropriate. To be
clear, this proposal does not ask a judge to advise; instead, it calls

270. Lang, supra note 219, at 962-63.
271. See Love, supra note 221, at 117 n.158 ("A just and fair prosecutor will consider
the collateral consequences that may apply in a particular case and take them into account when considering a disposition.").
272. See Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 32 HOFSTHA L. REV. 1349, 1401 (2004) ("[A]ny participant in the criminal justice
system knows that the colloquy between the judge and the defendant is scripted, ritualistic, perfunctory, pro forma, and quite meaningless."); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining
and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 460 (2008) ("[I]n many cases, the rituals surrounding plea acceptance and sentencing lack real significance as decision making processes .... Procedural justice in these contexts may thus appear an empty formality and
serve only to highlight the absence of procedural justice in reaching the plea deal.").
273. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 33, at 1158.
("Checklists or computer programs could flag typical collateral consequences of which defense lawyers must warn, based on each defendant's charges, jurisdiction, immigration
status, address, and job.").
274. See Lang, supra note 219, at 986 ("A judge cannot satisfactorily investigate the
defendant's individual situation, gauge the importance of plea consequences to the defendant, and advise the defendant based on that information. That is the province of an
attorney: the defendant's advocate."); see also Ewald & Smith, supra note 115, at 155 (discussing how judges in the survey firmly believed that it is the responsibility of counsel to
advise).

2015]

BEYOND THE RIGH'r TO COUNSEL

1185

on judges to issue notice at various stages of the process to remind all parties involved (defense counsel, defendant, and prosecutor) of anterior considerations when crafting justice. 275
The form of notice would consist of additional warnings specific
to the most prevalent collateral consequences related to a particular charge in the particular jurisdiction. These warnings would
exist in the written and verbal colloquies. In the courtroom, the
judge would notify the defendant of the most prevalent, automatic consequences that stem from a particular charge, ask the defendant whether he has discussed the import of those consequences with counsel, and, if not, allow the defendant time to do
so before formally entering the plea. Because the plea colloquy
would contain those same consequences, defense counsel would,
as a matter of best practice, likely begin discussing those consequences with a defendant before appearing in front of the judge.
But regardless of whether the discussion with counsel occurs before or after appearing in front of the judge, the defendant receives knowledge that is currently not mandatory prior to entering the plea. Perhaps most importantly, he receives it from
multiple sources-the colloquy, the judge, and defense counsel276
thereby contributing to institutional literacy.
Determining which consequences a court should share at the
time a plea is entered is the most difficult conceptual problem,
given the myriad consequences that could apply to a particular
situation, especially in jurisdictions beyond the specific court. 277
Attempting to craft doctrine that gauges seriousness as it pertains to a defendant's particular circumstances may run into serious "hindsight is 20/20" problems during post-conviction litigation.278 This is an area where a proposal cannot seek too much at
275. See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining supra note 236, at 164 ("The quasimarket forces at work encourage all parties involved to work together to achieve plea bargains that benefit all parties directly involved.").
276. The unique role of the prosecutor is discussed below. See infra Part IV.B.
277. Love, supra note 221, at 100 ("[A] court cannot, and perhaps should not, be expected to know what consequences might be important to a particular criminal defendant
by virtue of some personal characteristic or circumstance, such as citizenship or employment or residence."); see also Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglements: A Framework for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1392
(2012) (noting the difficulty in determining which consequences are worth including and
proposing a test that focuses on whether the consequence "significantly entangles" the civil and criminal Jaw).
278. Bibas and Roberts have proposed tests for determining which consequences should
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the risk of achieving doctrine that is impossible to -institute on the
ground. For that reason, inclusion of automatic consequences in
guilty plea colloquies is the most viable step. Automatic consequences would include those consequences that operate by the
particular state and federal law as a result of a particular conviction for a specific charge; for example, a particular charge may
bar entry into a particular field or render someone ineligible for
certain benefits. Furthermore, automatic consequences would include any immediate loss or deprivation of a substantive due process right, such as the right to vote. Because those rights are either enumerated or for the most part already explicated by
courts, the list would not be endless or run the risk of assessing a
defendant's particular situation. If this list remains too long, one
solution would be to further qualify the standard to include only
those consequences that would likely continue to affect the offender beyond expiration of the direct sentence. 279 Further, the list
would also only include the consequences that are particular to
the state where the prosecution occurred and under federal law,
as qualified above. One can envision how each state might be better suited to determine which consequences appear the most,
based on which charges are the most frequent sources of convictions. 280
Finally, practically achieving notice of automatic consequences
would not be as difficult as some may think: once such consequences are catalogued on a charge-by-charge basis, making them
part of written plea colloquies that will be executed in the presence of defense counsel would be possible. And once they are part

be included. Roberts suggests the following standard: "[W]henever a reasonable person in
the defendant's situation would deem knowledge of th[at] consequence, penal or otherwise,
to be a significant factor in deciding whether to plead guilty." Roberts, supra note 22, at
674. Bibas, similarly, suggests the following: "[W]hether [the consequence] is severe
enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal defendant's bargaining
calculus." Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1147.
279. Shanahan develops this concept when she states, "Where a legislature has chosen
to make the conviction operate past the imposed sentence of incarceration or fine through
another civil consequence, without any additional process, the legislature is likely to have
created sufficient entanglement under this framework." See Shanahan, supra note 277, at
1416.
280. States could determine the quantity of offenders convicted of a particular offense
that remain in the state, which would in turn inform which consequences within that jurisdiction are likely to be most prevalent. Interestingly, this approach has a nice federalism component to it. States can be laboratories of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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of the colloquy, defense counsel will be forced to explain them, or
at the minimum, answer any possible questions or concerns from
defendants. It presents a classic case of "putting things in writing." Judges also would see these colloquies, question the defendant and defense counsel about their contents, and assess the validity of the plea, all things considered.
B. The Role of the Prosecutor: A Brady-Lihe Solution for
Collateral Consequences
As the Supreme Court conceded in Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors are the "architects" of criminal proceedings. 281 Brady requires prosecutors to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence
that is material to guilt or innocence. 282 While Brady was decided
when trials still dominated the Court's jurisprudence in terms of
criminal procedure, this assertion remains true in a system dominated by guilty pleas. Arguably, the hands of the prosecutor are
even more involved today, given the prevalence of negotiated
pleas and the rarity that is a trial. This reality has led to calls for
prosecutorial awareness of collateral consequences in order to
positively influence the administration of justice. 283 In a largely
unregulated bargaining market, 28 ·1 it only makes sense that prosecutorial behavior be regulated as it relates to furnishing information about collateral consequences. Considering that such con281. 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
282. Id. at 86-88.
283. Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the President, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2001,
at 5 (noting how prosecutors "must consider [collateral consequences] if we are to see that
justice is done. How can we ignore a consequence of our prosecution that we know will
surely be imposed by the operation of law?"). Commentators often cite professional standards when emphasizing that prosecutors are tasked with seeking justice rather than simply convictions. See e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION at 4-5 (Feb. 12, 2007) (citing
Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the President: Collateral Consequences, THE
PROSECUTOR 5 (2001)); NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NA'l'IONAL PROSECUTION
STANDAHDS § 1-1.1 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%2
03rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf ("The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."); see also id. ("The primary responsibility of a
prosecutor is to seek justice.").
284. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1153 ("It is
astonishing that a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of imprisonment."). The market also is unregulated in the sense that fifty states administer prosecutions differently. Hence, "there is
little organized effort to develop consistent or progressive criminal justice policy." Robert
M.A. Johnson, A Prosecutor's Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. Lours U.
Pun. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2011).
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sequences are attempts by legislatures to curtail an offender's
freedom post-conviction in an indirect way, and prosecutors are
tasked with enforcing the criminal law that can lead to those consequences, it follows that prosecutors should contribute to awareness of them. 28 ''
The Court's decision in Brady provides an opening for expansion of the prosecutorial role in this context. In Brady, the Court
noted how "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." 286
With that holding, Brady "launched the modern development of
constitutional disclosure requirements." 287
Fast forward to the administration of a plea-dominated system
today, and Brady's disclosure obligations in the evidentiary context related to the right to trial under the Sixth Amendment
could be transplanted with respect to awareness of collateral consequences. Coupling Brady's holding with Padilla's recognition
that guilty pleas dominate the system allows for an expanded role
for prosecutors if fairness in the administration of justice is to
remain a priority. Just as prosecutors "shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant," they also are the primary mover when
it comes to resolving cases with a guilty plea. 288 Prosecutors have
total authority to adjust charges and to decide which charge to offer as a part of a plea bargain. 289 In this respect, prosecutors could
be tasked with informing defendants of automatic collateral consequences when extending plea offers, especially if a defendant is
proceeding pro se. 290 In practice, prosecutors could be required to

285. In other words, collateral consequences result from prosecutorial enforcement of
the criminal law. Thus, prosecutors, tasked with the administration of justice, should
know more about the consequences of their decisions.
286. 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
287. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685,
686 (2006).
288. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
289. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1128 ("A range of
possible overlapping charges can fit a single transaction or episode, and prosecutors have
discretion to choose among them to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to
achieve pleas, or any number of reasons."). This proposal also leaves room for educating
police officers about the ramifications of charging in the first place.
290. This is especially important in lower-level misdemeanor prosecutions involving
defendants who may not qualify for counsel due to their income or because of the current
right to counsel doctrine.
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furnish- a written plea offer with a list of the automatic consequences pertaining to a particular charge. 291 Dare one say that
such an obligation would be too practically difficult. It has already been done post-Padilla in the Second Circuit with respect
to immigration consequences and notice of potential sentencing
enhancements should a defendant re-offend. 292
The legal basis for such an obligation could come in the form of
a constitutional command, a la Brady, state-specific legislative efforts, or ethical obligations under the rules of professional conduct for prosecutors. A constitutional command would amplify the
seriousness of collateral consequences in the spirit of Padilla.
However, it would likely take several cases to flesh out the precise meaning and scope of such a command. Hence, an affirmative
constitutional obligation, while incredibly forceful, would run the
risk of resulting in the same problems mentioned above regarding
the development of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence
post-Padilla.
Because state jurisdictions are the best equipped to determine
which collateral consequences under their particular codes are
most prevalent, one possibility is jurisdiction-specific legislative
action that creates disclosure requirements by statute. Disclosure
obligations imposed by statute would heighten awareness immediately and may not be subject to as many "fleshing out" problems
that come with a broader constitutional command. On the other
hand, such efforts would remain the product of political will and
subject to the same budgetary constraints plaguing most local
governments. Considering that the plight of criminal defendants
rarely serves as persuasive motivation for legislative action, leaning on the possibility of legislative prescriptions might be wishful
thinking. A more realistic jurisdiction-specific goal may be advocating for changes in the rules of professional conduct on a stateby-state basis. Expanded ethical obligations could develop from
291. Admittedly, the same cataloguing concerns that are present with notice by the judiciary exist here. However, this author is confident that projects such as that undertaken
by the ABA Collateral Consequences Project, plus technology, could make furnishing this
information fairly simple with the aid of institutional memory.
292. N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N, PADILLA v. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT
SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER 6 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/up
loads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf; see United States v. Pimentel, 932
F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting prosecutors send a letter to the defense explaining how conviction on a particular charge could affect sentencing for a future conviction).
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state-driven studies about which collateral consequences are most
prevalent in the particular jurisdiction. Because any modification
to the rules of professional conduct would- likely involve input
from many members of the bar, the need for extra-legal literacy
293
efforts would become more apparent to attorneys as well.
Hence, a combined approach of heightened ethical obligations for
prosecutors and extra-legal literacy measures may be the most
realistic and practical solution to heightening literacy institutionally and individually. With the support of state and local government, these efforts could be uniquely tailored to the most
commonly felt collateral consequences in the particular jurisdiction.
Regardless of the source of the obligation, the effect of such a
requirement cannot be understated in terms of heightening literacy overall. Again, such a practice likely would heighten literacy
for all parties and make prosecutors generally more aware of
what types of consequences result, thereby allowing for individually tailored offers. Prosecutors, constantly in conversation with
defense counsel, would become more aware of consequences generally and more aware of their application in particular circumstances. Prosecutorial disclosure also would assist defense counsel when advising clients, especially if defense counsel was
unaware of a particular consequence. Increasing awareness on
both sides of the bargain comports with the Court's statement in
Padilla about creative crafting of plea deals. 291 And in theory,
prosecutorial awareness and disclosure could lead to better systemic results for both sides: defendants might receive better plea
deals overall and prosecutors may dispose of more cases through
the plea process when defendants feel they can maintain a livelihood despite a conviction. Finally, heightened systemic awareness of collateral consequences could result in a deterrent effect

293. Consider how the legal profession could look to health literacy projects that correspond to particular problems in particular places for possible guidance in this field. Just as
a particular city may have certain health illiteracy problems, a particular jurisdiction likely has certain legal illiteracy problems.
294. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). When both sides at the negotiating
table are aware of what is at stake for the defendant, the underlying facts, and seriousness of the crime, the opportunity for a well-crafted plea is better.
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that is not fully felt when such consequences remain in the
dark. 295
CONCLUSION

Awareness of collateral consequences is a systemic literacy issue that requires a multi-player solution. The Supreme Court's
admission in Padilla and Frye that plea-bargaining is now the
dominant method of resolving a criminal case led to increased responsibilities for defense counsel to be considered effective. But
attacking this literacy problem with only one party mirrors cutting the grass with a pair of scissors. Tasking an already overburdened, under-funded, and ill-resourced defense bar with ensuring notice of such consequences cannot be the only avenue of
redress. Increasing the number of cases that require counsel will
remain subject to the same legislative will and budgetary issues
that currently confront the right to counsel fifty years after Gideon. Put simply, more than expansion of the right to counsel is
necessary.
Fortunately, the criminal system contains other able-bodied actors that can contribute to eradicating systemic illiteracy of collateral consequences. Judges, who now process pleas significantly
more than presiding over trials, can serve informative roles at
various stages of a prosecution. Prosecutors, who offer plea bargains and exchange ideas about resolving cases with defense
counsel, also can heighten notice in the plea-bargaining context
by disclosing indirect consequences linked to specific charges.
These repetitive efforts will lead to broader awareness amongst
all players, thereby contributing to a fairer administration of justice that comports with the complementary guarantees of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

295. Ewald & Smith, supra note 115, at 161 ("It is possible that given such variation
[in discussion of collateral consequences in courtrooms], these sanctions today are not imposed clearly, publicly, and consistently enough to function as the kind of 'expressive' or
'shaming penalties' some advocates presumably have in mind.").

